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Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 8 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for January 2013 (see annex). As can be seen from the annexed information, during the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia continued intensive fire from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-23138 (E) 220213

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Annex to the letter dated 8 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia* for January 2013

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
1	1 January	0005-0020	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
2		0010-0020	Barekamavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gaymagly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
3		0020-0030	Berdavan village, (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
4		0210-0225	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
5		0215-0225	Javahirli and Ahmadaghaly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
6		0500-0510	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
7		0500-0515		AKM assault rifle	–
8		0510-0515		AKM assault rifle	–
9		0540-0545		AKM assault rifle	–
10		0725-0730		AK-type assault rifle	–
11		1300-1325	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
12		2005-2020	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
13		2040-2045	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
14		2245-2300	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
15		2250-2300			–
16	2 January	0005-0015	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
17		1820-1825	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
18		1825-1827	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
19		2220-2235	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan listed in this annex are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire-point areas.

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
20	3 January	0020-0025	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
21		0245-0300	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
22		0330-0345	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
23		1020-1030		AK-type assault rifle	–
24		1650-1700	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
25		1815-1840	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
26		2050-2055	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
27		2315-2325	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
28	4 January	0202-0205	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
29		0210-0215			–
30		0545-0555			–
31	5 January	0040-0050	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
32		0550-0555	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
33		2240-2245	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
34	6 January	1440-1500	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
35		1816-1825	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
36		2230-2245	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
37	7 January	0005-0030	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
38		0330-0335	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
39	8 January	0105-0115	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
40		0205-0215	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
41		0245-0300	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
42		1200-1230	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayiy village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
43		1245-1250	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
44	9 January	0145-0150	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
45		0340-0350	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	
46		0350-0405	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
47		1015-1020	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
48	10 January	0040-0045	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
49		0040-0050	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
50		0140-0145	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
51		1555-1615	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
52		1850-1905	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
53	11 January	0005-0015	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
54		0050-0110	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
55		2330-2335	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
56		0225-0230	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
57		0225-0230	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
58	12 January	0335-0340	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
59		0820-0830	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
60		1630-1645	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
61		1725-1730	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
62		2010-2015	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
63		2255-2310			–
64		2355-2358			–
65	13 January	0005-0010	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
66		1725-1730	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
67		2030-2035	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
68		2140-2155	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
69		2150-2200	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
70		2330-2345	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
71		2350-2355	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
72	14 January	0025-0040	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
73		0345-0350	Javahirli and Chiragly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
74		0800-0815	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
75		1620-1640	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
76		1815-1819	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
77		1825-1827	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
78		2115-2130	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
79		2245-2250	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
80		2250-2255	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
81	15 January	0150-0200	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
82		1830-1850	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
83		1905-1925	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
84		1850-1940			–
85	16 January	0105-0115	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
86		0140-0145	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
87		0830-0835	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
88		1555-1600	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
89		1700-1720	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
90		1720-1725	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
91		2140-2150	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
92		2210-2220	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
93	17 January	0005-0020	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
94		0110-0115	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
95		0225-0230	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
96		1630-1640	Talysh and Tapgaraqoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
97		2030-2035	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
98	18 January	0250-0305	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
99		1140-1150	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
100		1155-1200	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
101		1655-1700	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
102		2320-2325	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
103	19 January	0050-0100	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
104		0310-0315	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
105		1355-1420	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
106		1415-1420	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
107		1435-1440	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
108		1440-1505	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
109		1630-1645	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
110		2325-2330	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
111		2345-2350	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
112	20 January	0140-0150	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
113		0140-0150	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
114		0145-0150	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
115		0155-0200			–
116		0245-0250	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
117		0300-0305			–
118		0350-0355	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
119		0555-0600	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
120		1620-1625	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
121		1725-1730	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
122		2005-2015	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
123		2045-2055	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
124		2050-2105	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
125		2050-2105	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
126		2245-2255	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
127		2330-2335	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
128	21 January	0450-0500	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
129		1950-2015	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
130		2040-2045	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
131	22 January	0010-0015	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
132		0240-0245	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
133		0550-0555	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
134		1620-1628	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
135		2140-2155	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
136	23 January	0255-0257	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
137		0620-0622	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
138		0630-0637			–
139		1330-1340	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
140		1755-1805	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
141		1900-1905	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
142		2005-2025	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
143	24 January	0050-0055	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
144		0720-0730	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
145		1525-1530	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
146		1655-1700			–
147		1845-1905	Mosesgekh village (Berd district, Armenia) and Alibeyli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
148		2115-2120	Merzili and Giyamaddinii villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
149	25 January	0030-0040	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
150		0540-0545	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
151		0630-0636	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
152		0630-0636	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
153		0700-0705	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
154		1355-1410	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
155		1400-1420			–
156		2130-2135	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
157		2300-2320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
158		2340-2350	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
159	26 January	0035-0040	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
160		0445-0450	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
161		1030-1055	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
162		1645-1655	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
163		2205-2210	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
164		2250-2255	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
165		2310-2320	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
166	27 January	0025-0030	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
167		0205-0240	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
168		0405-0410	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
169		1750-1755	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
170	28 January	0035-0045	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
171		0135-0140	Javahirli and Ahmadaghaly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
172		0430-0500	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
173		1635-1640	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
174	29 January	0520-0530	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
175		1735-1740	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
176	30 January	0145-0155	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
177		0240-0250	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
178		0400-0405	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
179		0735-0740	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
180		1410-1420	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Mutudere village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
181		1525-1530	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
182		2120-2125	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
183		2215-2220	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
184		2220-2225	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
185	31 January	0130-0135	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
186		0200-0205			–
187		0335-0340	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
188		0550-0555	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
189		1810-1820	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
190		2110-2120	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
191		2115-2125	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
192		2147-2150	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
193		2210-2220	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

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Question of Palestine

Status of Palestine in the United Nations

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/19. In that resolution, the Assembly accorded to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice. It also reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and expressed hope that the Security Council would consider favourably the application submitted on 23 September 2011 by the State of Palestine for admission to full membership in the United Nations. The Assembly also affirmed its determination to contribute to the attainment of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East that ends the occupation that began in 1967 and fulfils the vision of two States: an independent, sovereign, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security with Israel on the basis of the pre-1967 borders. It expressed the urgent need for the resumption and acceleration of negotiations within the Middle East peace process, and urged all States and the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system to continue to support and assist the Palestinian people in the early realization of their right to self-determination, independence and freedom. This present report provides information on the steps taken regarding the change of Palestine's status in the United Nations, which does not apply to organizations and bodies outside of the United Nations, as well as the progress made, or lack thereof, in resuming the Middle East peace process. The Permanent Mission of Israel and the Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations have been consulted in the preparation of the present report.

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II. Non-member observer status in the United Nations

A. Name and status of Palestine

2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 67/19, Palestine has been treated as a non-member observer State by the Secretariat since the adoption of the resolution. Accordingly, the publication on permanent missions prepared by the Protocol and Liaison Service entitled "Permanent Missions to the United Nations" (the Blue Book) now lists Palestine under category II as a "Non-member State having received a standing invitation to participate as observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent observer mission at Headquarters".

3. On 12 December 2012, Palestine informed the Secretary-General that the designation "State of Palestine" should be used in all documents and for its nameplate in all United Nations meetings. It further informed the Secretary-General that the Head of State was Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of Palestine. On 8 January 2013, Palestine informed the Secretary-General that the Head of Government was Salam Fayyad, Prime Minister of the State of Palestine, and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine was Riad Malki. In accordance with its request, the designation "State of Palestine" is now used in all documents of the United Nations and on nameplates to be used in United Nations meetings. Mr. Abbas is now addressed as the President of the State of Palestine, Mr. Fayyad as the Prime Minister of the State of Palestine and Mr. Malki as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine.

B. Participation in work of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations, as well as in United Nations conferences

4. The State of Palestine continues to enjoy the right of participation in the sessions and work of the General Assembly and the international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly or other organs of the United Nations, as well as in United Nations conferences, pursuant to resolutions 43/160 and 52/250 and as set out in the note by the Secretary-General on participation of Palestine in the work of the United Nations of 4 August 1998 (A/52/1002). Those rights are not affected by resolution 67/19.

5. As a general matter, the State of Palestine does not enjoy the right to vote, including in elections. Nor may the State of Palestine submit its own candidacy for any election or appointment or, submit the names of candidates for any election or appointment, with one exception. Pursuant to the Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters have the right to submit nominations for and to vote in the elections for the permanent and ad litem judges of the Residual Mechanism.

6. Pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, the State of Palestine may also place items on the provisional agenda of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

7. With respect to conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly and other United Nations conferences, as a non-member observer State of the United Nations and a member of UNESCO, the State of Palestine may participate fully and on an equal basis with other States in conferences that are open to members of specialized agencies or that are open to all States. Arrangements are being made to ensure the full participation of the State of Palestine in conferences convened on that basis.

III. Middle East peace process

8. Following the adoption of resolution 67/19, I reiterated my position that the Palestinians have a legitimate right to their own independent State and that Israel has the right to live in peace and security with its neighbours. I also stressed that there was no substitute for negotiations to that end, and the vote underscored the urgency of a resumption of meaningful talks. I thus appealed to all concerned to act responsibly.

9. Both parties have repeated their commitment to the two-State solution. In his speech to the General Assembly and in other statements he has made since, President Abbas proclaimed his willingness to engage with Israel after the formation of a new Government following its parliamentary elections of 22 January. Addressing the Security Council on 23 January 2013, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine reiterated the Palestinian commitment to peace and the two-State solution and observed that the overwhelming support for resolution 67/19 clearly demonstrated the international community's commitment, including that of the Arab and Muslim world, to the two-State solution. While sharply criticizing settlement activity of Israel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the need to establish clear parameters and a time frame for peace. At the same meeting, an overwhelming majority of Member States urged a credible return to peace negotiations, and many highlighted the historic nature of the 29 November vote of the General Assembly.

10. The Prime Minister of Israel reiterated his commitment to peace and a two-State solution in press conferences held on 5 December 2012 and 19 February 2013. However, on 29 November 2012 in the Assembly and on 23 January 2013 in the Security Council open debate on the situation in the Middle East, the Permanent Representative of Israel stated the position of Israel that in their view General Assembly resolution 67/19 could not serve as acceptable terms of reference for future peace negotiations and that it did not confer Palestinian statehood or constitute recognition of a Palestinian State. The Permanent Representative of Israel also objected to any attempt to alter the status of Palestinians, outside the agreed negotiating framework. At the same meetings, the United States of America and Canada echoed these positions.

11. In spite of reiterated calls for negotiated peace, actions on the ground have further undermined mutual trust. Following the adoption of the resolution, the Government of Israel announced plans for construction of thousands of housing units in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and, most alarmingly, several thousand housing units in the "E-1" area east of Jerusalem. In statements on 2 December 2012 and 14 January 2013, I expressed my grave concern at this development, which risked cutting off East Jerusalem from the rest of the West

Bank and, if constructed, would represent an almost fatal blow to remaining chances of securing a two-State solution, and called for any settlement plan in the E-1 area to be rescinded. Overall, approximately 11,500 housing units of Israeli settlements have been advanced or approved since 29 November 2012, including approximately 3,500 in the E-1 area, 5,000 in East Jerusalem, and the rest in various other West Bank settlements. I have repeatedly stressed that all settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law.

12. The Government of Israel also initially withheld approximately $115 million of Palestinian customs revenue collected in December and January. The funds for December were released to the Palestinian Authority in January in line with the obligation that Israel accepted as part of the 1994 Paris Protocol, which remains in force. The funds for January are expected to be transferred at the end of February.

13. The backdrop to these events has been a worsening security situation in the West Bank and a tenuous calm in Gaza following the truce announced on 21 November 2012 after an intensive diplomatic effort, including my own visit to the region.

14. In the West Bank, Israeli security forces, citing security concerns, conducted 969 operations and made 1,101 arrests from 29 November 2012 to 26 February 2013. A total of 7 Palestinians were killed and 1,065 were injured. Confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli settlers have occurred on an almost daily basis. Occupation measures have continued to impede Palestinian movement, while demolitions in Area C have intensified, leading to further displacements. In a worrying development, on 23 February 2013, a Palestinian man died in detention after his arrest by the Israeli Defense Forces days earlier in the West Bank. His death sparked a series of popular demonstrations and clashes with the Israeli Defense Forces. Earlier popular demonstrations in solidarity with prisoners on hunger strike had resulted in clashes with Israeli security forces. Hundreds of Palestinians were injured as a result, including by tear gas inhalation.

15. In Gaza, following the ceasefire understanding reached on 21 November 2012 under the auspices of Egypt, the calm largely held, but there was a significant disruption on 26 February 2013, when a rocket fired from Gaza landed on a street near the industrial area in the southern part of the city of Ashkelon. In total, two rockets have been fired and eight Israeli incursions have taken place since the ceasefire understanding was reached. Renewed shooting incidents have claimed the lives of two Palestinian civilians, mostly while they were attempting to approach the border fence. Efforts to consolidate the ceasefire have continued, in line with resolution 1860 (2009). The full implementation of the resolution includes the important step of overcoming the Palestinian political divide in ways that can advance the prospects for the realization of the two-State solution. In this regard, Egypt continued to facilitate progress in the implementation of previous reconciliation agreements among Palestinian factions. Elections are a central element of reconciliation, and the Central Elections Commission undertook a registration process in February 2013 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

16. The Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal visited Gaza for the first time from 7 to 10 December 2012. In a speech celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of Hamas he denied Israel any legitimacy, stressing that the Palestinian State will come from resistance not negotiations, in a clear rejection of a negotiated

two-State solution. Those inflammatory statements prompted condemnation by several members of the international community and the United Nations.

17. Since the adoption of the resolution, and as illustrated by the statements made during the open debate on the situation in the Middle East held by the Security Council on 23 January 2013, regional and international partners have voiced their alarm at the increasing risk the prolonged impasse in the peace process and facts on the ground, in particular Israeli settlement activity, pose to the viability of the two-State solution. Everyone has recognized the urgent need for action. At its meeting in Doha on 9 December 2012, the League of Arab States expressed doubt about the international architecture for the peace process and announced future consultations with the relevant players in the international community. In conclusions adopted on 10 December 2012, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union underlined the urgency of renewed, structured and substantial peace efforts in 2013 and reaffirmed its position that clear parameters outlining the basis for negotiations are key to a successful outcome. On 23 January 2013, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations stated that the United States remained fully committed to direct negotiations and continued to work vigorously towards that end.

18. Quartet envoys met in Brussels on 12 December 2012, and again on 10 January 2013 in Amman. They discussed ways to help the parties to avoid escalation diplomatically and on the ground in the short term, while also finding a way back to negotiations. I have also continued to engage with the parties, as well as with key international and regional leaders, both in New York and on the margins of international conferences and events, in order to encourage concerted efforts to forge a way forward.

19. The application for full United Nations membership remains pending before the Security Council.

IV. Support to Palestinian institutions and the right to self-determination

20. In spite of the fundamental challenges that remain, the Government of the State of Palestine remains committed to the advancement of the State-building agenda on which it has made notable progress in the past two years. This has been widely recognized by the international community, in particular at the successive meetings of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians in 2011 and 2012. Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 67/19 on 29 November 2012, President Abbas constituted a committee of Palestinian officials to examine a range of issues relating to statehood. Civil society has also contributed to the continued advancement, with women's groups convening an important conference in December, which culminated in the presentation of a list of vital demands, including the incorporation of a women's bill of rights in the constitution of the State of Palestine, ensuring that legislation adheres to international standards with respect to discrimination against women and implementing quotas for female participation in public institutions.

21. The United Nations has continued to provide support in the six areas that were highlighted in the report entitled "Palestinian State-building: a decisive period" presented by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle

East Peace Process to the meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee on 13 April 2011 (governance, rule of law and human rights; livelihoods and productive sectors; education and culture; health; social protection; and infrastructure and water). In each of these sectors, governmental functions were deemed sufficient for a functioning Government of a State. The United Nations has continued to align its activities to the priorities of the Palestinian National Plan and is currently developing its new United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the period 2014-2016 in collaboration with Palestinian authorities.

22. The Palestinian fiscal situation represents a core challenge. The full, timely and predictable transfer of Palestinian tax and customs revenues by Israel in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations is essential in order for the Government of the State of Palestine to be able to meet its financial obligations. Key among these is the payment of salaries to civil servants, who have launched strikes in protest against non-payment. Prime Minister Fayyad continues to call on Arab donors for contributions, emphasizing that there is unprecedented financial distress and potential for negative consequences. Ultimately, private-sector-led economic growth will enable the growth of a vibrant economy, which will benefit Palestinians and provide the tax base necessary to end the cycles of fiscal crisis.

23. International contributions amounted to $600 million in support of the recurrent budget last year, but further timely disbursement of assistance is essential. At its meeting in Doha on 9 December 2012, the League of Arab States voted to contribute $100 million per month in aid to the Palestinian Authority as a "financial safety net" to compensate for lost revenue incurred after Israel announced it would withhold clearance revenues. In January 2013, Saudi Arabia announced that it would disburse a further $20 million per month and Prime Minister Fayyad and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States approached a select number of countries during the Arab Economic and Social Development Summit, held in Riyadh on 21 January, to bridge the funding gap. At its first meeting, held in Tokyo on 13 and 14 February 2013, the Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development discussed support for the State-building efforts of Palestine.

V. Observations

24. The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 67/19 on 29 November 2012 by a majority of 138 votes in favour, following a period of prolonged stalemate in the political process, symbolized the growing international impatience with the long-standing occupation and clearly endorsed Palestinian aspirations to live in freedom and dignity in an independent State of their own, side by side with Israel in peace and security. The end to the occupation and to the conflict and the achievement of the two-State solution on the ground is long overdue. This can only be achieved, however, through negotiations to solve all final status issues.

25. The year 2013 will be decisive in the peace process. As I outlined in my address to the General Assembly on 22 January 2013, I identified five priorities in this regard: first, we must renew collective international engagement; second, we must resume meaningful negotiations; third, we must preserve stability in Gaza; fourth, we must make progress on Palestinian reconciliation under the leadership of

President Abbas within the framework of the commitments of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the positions of the Quartet; and fifth, we must prevent the financial collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Concerted action is essential if we are to salvage the realization on the ground of the two-State solution.

26. The situation on the ground remains a cause for serious concern. Continued settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law and runs contrary to Israel's obligations under the road map. It also undermines the viability of the two-State solution and the prospects for peace. Israel should heed the repeated calls of the international community and stop such activity.

27. Both sides have a common interest and responsibility in preventing an escalation of tensions. Recent spates of violence over the death of a Palestinian detainee and prisoners on prolonged hunger strikes are potentially eroding the calm necessary for the resumption of peace talks. I have expressed my deep concern and urged that a solution be reached without delay in order to end the prisoners' plight and preserve calm. International human rights obligations towards all Palestinian detainees and prisoners under Israeli custody must be fully respected.

28. Solidifying the ceasefire agreement in Gaza that was brokered by Egypt remains a pressing priority. The 26 February rocket attack from Gaza into Israel was unacceptable. I will continue to condemn any indiscriminate rocket fire from Gaza.

29. The parties need our collective support to create an environment conducive to a resumption of talks, as on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there is too much pain and anguish, disillusionment and dismay, for the parties to be able to overcome their genuine fears and dispel tensions on their own. It is incumbent upon the international community to foster synergy among the various ideas and initiatives being discussed to permit decisive progress towards a return to negotiations. The Arab Peace Initiative remains an important basis for ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and achieving regional peace. It should be encouraged and nurtured.

30. However, no international effort alone is sufficient for progress absent the requisite will from the parties themselves. Israeli and Palestinian leaders have stated that they are convinced the two-State solution is the only path towards a durable peace. They should realize that without serious engagement, the consequences for inaction could be dire for everyone. The parties must not only remain open to new initiatives to overcome the current impasse, but must now demonstrate their seriousness and refrain from actions and negative steps that undermine the situation on the ground and complicate a return to meaningful negotiations in the critical period ahead.

31. As Secretary-General, I will continue to do my utmost to achieve a negotiated two-State solution, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003) and 1860 (2009), that will resolve the core issues — territory, security, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, water — and constitute the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and all claims related to it. I call on the parties and all stakeholders to act with determination, responsibility and vision. None of the steps to that end are easy, but we cannot afford another year without courageous action for the purpose of achieving the two-State solution reaffirmed by resolution 67/19.

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Agenda item 146
Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Updated financial position of closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2012

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report provides information on the updated financial position of 24 closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2012. Of those missions, 5 had cash deficits owing to outstanding payments of assessed contributions, while 19 had cash surpluses available for credit to Member States totalling $28.2 million.

The report also presents proposals for the consideration of the General Assembly to address the issue of outstanding dues to Member States from closed peacekeeping missions, as requested by the Assembly in its resolution 65/293, as well as the cash requirements of active peacekeeping operations.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report provides updated information on the financial position of the following closed peacekeeping missions for which final performance reports have been issued: Military Observer Group of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA); United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA); United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB); United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL); United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) and United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA); United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG); United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH); United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH); United Nations Military Liaison Team in Cambodia (UNMLT); United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT); United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL); United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) and United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF); United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP); United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) and Civilian Police Support Group; United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET); and United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

2. As at 30 June 2012, 19 of the 24 peacekeeping missions covered in the present report had cash surpluses available for credit to Member States totalling $28,188,000 as set out in table 1.

Table 1

Consolidated net cash position of ONUB, ONUCA/ONUSAL, ONUMOZ, UNAMSIL/UNOMSIL, UNAVEM/MONUA, UNIIMOG, UNIKOM, UNMEE, UNMIBH, UNMIH, UNMLT, UNMOT, UNOMIL, UNOMUR/UNAMIR, UNPF, UNPREDEP, UNTAES/Civilian Police Support Group, UNTAET/UNMISET and UNTAG as at 30 June 2012

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Description	*Amount*
Cash assets	211 047
Less: other liabilities	182 859
Net cash available for credit to Member States as at 30 June 2012	**28 188**

3. The composition of the net cash balance of $28,188,000 is broken down by mission in table 2.

Table 2
Closed peacekeeping missions with net cash balances as at 30 June 2012
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	*Amount*
ONUB	600
ONUCA/ONUSAL	134
ONUMOZ	31
UNAMSIL/UNOMSIL	718
UNAVEM/MONUA	6 382
UNIIMOG	134
UNIKOM	93
UNMEE	1 903
UNMIBH	503
UNMIH	1 814
UNMLT	4
UNMOT	91
UNOMIL	143
UNOMUR/UNAMIR	4 113
UNPF	8 791
UNPREDEP	361
UNTAES/Civilian Police Support Group	402
UNTAET/UNMISET	1 677
UNTAG	294
Total	**28 188**

4. The amount of $28,188,000 shown in tables 1 and 2 does not take into account $10,816,000 owed by two closed peacekeeping missions ($7,366,000 by UNSMIH/UNTMIH/MIPONUH and $3,450,000 by MINURCA) and another $51,000,000 owed by three active peacekeeping missions, including $16,500,000 by the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), $31,500,000 by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and $3,000,000 by the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS), which remained unpaid as at 30 June 2012. As at 30 November 2012, the outstanding loans owed by active peacekeeping missions totalled $23,000,000 including $19,500,000 by UNMIK and $3,500,000 by MINURSO.

5. Five of the peacekeeping missions covered in the present report had cash deficits totalling $86,719,000 as at 30 June 2012, owing to outstanding payments of assessed contributions, as shown in table 3.

Table 3
Consolidated net cash position of the MINUGUA Military Observer Group, MINURCA, UNOSOM, UNSMIH/UNTMIH/MIPONUH and UNTAC as at 30 June 2012
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Amount*
Cash assets	490
Less: liabilities	87 209
Operating deficit as at 30 June 2012	**(86 719)**

6. The liabilities included loans amounting to $23,636,000 owed to closed peacekeeping missions ($10,816,000) and to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund ($12,820,000). The operating deficit of $86,719,000 is broken down by mission in table 4.

Table 4
Closed peacekeeping missions with cash deficits as at 30 June 2012
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	*Amount*
MINUGUA Military Observer Group	(125)
MINURCA	(23 822)
UNOSOM	(15 438)
UNSMIH/UNTMIH/MIPONUH	(7 275)
UNTAC	(40 059)
Total	**(36 719)**

II. Outstanding dues to Member States from closed missions

7. As requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 65/293, the Secretary-General made proposals in his report on the updated financial position of closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2011 (A/66/665) to address the issue of outstanding dues to Member States from closed peacekeeping missions with net cash deficits. In the present report, the Secretary-General is offering a new proposal to address this issue, as detailed below.

Table 5
Cash and liabilities in closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2012
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Amount*
Cash	
Cash in closed missions with surpluses (table 1)	211 047
Cash in closed missions with deficits (table 3)	490
Repayment of borrowings by active missions (para. 4)	51 000
Total cash available in all closed missions	**262 537**
Liabilities	
Liabilities in closed missions with surpluses (table 1)	182 859
Liabilities in closed missions with deficits (table 3)	
Owed to closed missions (para. 6)	10 816
Owed to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (para. 6)	12 820
Outstanding claims (annex II)	63 080
Other liabilities	493
Liabilities in closed missions with deficits	**87 209**
Total liabilities in all closed missions	**270 068**

8. As shown in table 5 above, the cash assets in the 19 closed peacekeeping missions with net cash surpluses totalled $211,047,000 as at 30 June 2012, and the cash assets in the five closed missions with net cash deficits totalled $490,000, for a total of $211,537,000 in cash assets. This amount is net of borrowings by active peacekeeping operations, which, as indicated in paragraph 4 above, amounted to $51,000,000 as at 30 June 2012. Upon settlement of borrowings by active peacekeeping operations, total cash assets would amount to $262,537,000.

9. As shown in table 5, as at 30 June 2012, total liabilities in the closed peacekeeping missions with net cash surpluses totalled $182,859,000, and liabilities in the closed missions with net cash deficits totalled $87,209,000, for a total of $270,068,000 in liabilities. The liabilities of $87,209,000 in the closed missions with net cash deficits include $63,080,000 in outstanding claims owed to troop-contributing countries (see annex II), and, as indicated in paragraphs 4 and 6 above, $10,816,000 owed to two closed missions with net cash surpluses and $12,820,000 owed to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.

10. The Secretary-General proposes using the total cash assets of $262,537,000 referred to in paragraph 8 above to settle the amounts still due to Member States in closed missions with cash surpluses ($182,859,000), the outstanding claims owed to troop-contributing countries in closed missions with cash deficits ($63,080,000), and the amount owed to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund ($12,820,000) for a total of liabilities to be settled of $258,759,000. However, should the General Assembly approve this proposal, a mechanism to address the issue of cash requirements of active peacekeeping operations will be necessary, as explained in paragraphs 11 to 13 below.

III. Cash requirements of the Organization

11. As a result of the inherent unpredictability of receipts of assessed contributions, liquidity in peacekeeping missions is volatile, with cash surpluses of closed missions currently being used to alleviate the cash shortages in active peacekeeping operations. In accordance with financing resolutions of the General Assembly, notifications are issued to Member States for their assessed contributions to active peacekeeping missions up to the end of the mandate period for each mission as authorized by the Security Council. Experience has shown that there is a significant time lag, often ranging from about 60 to 120 days, between the issuance of notifications to Member States and the receipt of assessed contributions. Pending the payment of assessed contributions, any cash shortfalls for active missions are met from loans from closed peacekeeping missions.

12. As a result of outstanding assessments in the special accounts of some active missions, there has been a continuing need to borrow from closed missions. Cross-borrowing was required in the 2010/11 financial period for four active operations, namely, MINURSO, UNMIK, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), for a total of $88.9 million. Cross-borrowing increased to $118 million in the 2011/12 financial period for seven active operations, namely, MINURSO, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), UNFICYP, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), UNMIK and UNSMIS, and totalled $51.0 million as at 30 June 2012. Additional cross-borrowing of $11 million from the accounts of closed peacekeeping operations has been required so far during the 2012/13 financial period for three active missions, namely, MINURSO, UNMIK and UNSMIS. Furthermore, the amount required for cross-borrowing by active missions peaked during the 2011/12 financial period at $93 million in September 2011 and during the first five months of the current period at $62 million in July 2012. Borrowings, settlements and peak levels of borrowing from July 2008 to November 2012 are reflected in annexes III and IV.

13. The Secretary-General recognizes that the liquidity of active peacekeeping operations is not directly linked to the issue of cash surpluses in closed missions. However, as shown in annex III, active peacekeeping operations have repeatedly faced liquidity problems that necessitated borrowing. It is therefore proposed that the General Assembly authorize temporary borrowing between active peacekeeping missions, which is currently not permitted according to the terms of the Assembly's resolutions on the financing of peacekeeping operations. In those resolutions, the Assembly emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions. This new mechanism is not expected to negatively impact the operations of any active peacekeeping mission, as past data on cash requirements of active peacekeeping missions shows that the temporary needs for cross-borrowing of active peacekeeping missions have consistently been relatively minor compared to the total cash position of all active peacekeeping operations at any point in time. The Secretary-General would closely monitor the new mechanism and report on its working, including any adjustments needed, in future reports.

IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

14. **The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are:**

(a) **To take note of the present report;**

(b) **To consider the Secretary-General's proposals for the settlement of the outstanding dues to Member States in closed peacekeeping missions and to address the cash requirements of active peacekeeping operations;**

(c) **To allow the retention of the net cash balance of $28.2 million available in 19 closed peacekeeping missions if no new mechanism is approved to address the cash requirements of active peacekeeping operations.**

Annex I

Unpaid assessments, accounts payable to Member States and other liabilities of closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2012

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	*Unpaid assessments*	*Accounts payable to Member States*[a]	*Other liabilities*
MINUGUA Military Observer Group	145	–	125
MINURCA	35 545	7 480	16 462
ONUB	785	1 677	24
ONUCA/ONUSAL	312	2 220	–
ONUMOZ	16 703	537	–
UNAMSIL/UNOMSIL	728	11 705	9
UNAVEM/MONUA	34 893	9 330	–
UNIIMOG	10	2 747	–
UNIKOM	520	1 876	–
UNMEE	154	8 434	57
UNMIBH	33 949	9 128	43
UNMIH	14	36 153	–
UNMLT	–	95	1
UNMOT	1	1 920	1
UNOMIL	4	3 001	–
UNOMUR/UNAMIR	1 328	10 109	5
UNOSOM	57 810	15 561	–
UNPF	137 825	58 210	7
UNPREDEP	1 238	9 349	–
UNSMIH/UNTMIH/MIPONUH	19 390	114	7 366
UNTAC	40 453	40 101	–
UNTAES/Civilian Police Support Group	8 725	8 798	–
UNTAET/UNMISET	27 363	4 159	–
UNTAG	15	3 229	–
Total	**417 910**	**245 967**	**24 101**

[a] Inclusive of amounts owed to troop-contributing countries for contingent-owned equipment, as well as credits to Member States from unencumbered balances pending instructions on their disposition.

Annex II

Outstanding claims in closed missions with cash deficits as at 30 June 2012

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Contingent-owned equipment	*Letters of assist*	*Total*
MINURCA	7 477	3	7 480
UNOSOM	12 453	3 037	15 490
UNSMIH/UNTMIH/MIPONUH	–	114	114
UNTAC	21 910	18 086	39 996
Total	**41 840**	**21 240**	**63 080**

Annex III

Borrowings by active missions from closed peacekeeping missions, July 2008 to 16 October 2012

(Millions of United States dollars)



Annex IV

Borrowings, settlements and peak levels of cross-borrowing by active missions from closed missions for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 November 2012

(Millions of United States dollars)

Month, year	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*	*Month, year*	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*	*Month, year*	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*
July 2008	26.5	–	53.5	53.5	July 2010	–	–	12.0	12.0	July 2012	11.0	–	62.0	62.0
August 2008	3.0	(40.0)	16.5	56.5	August 2010	6.4	–	18.4	18.4	August 2012	–	(8.5)	53.5	62.0
September 2008	60.0	(4.0)	72.5	72.5	September 2010	–	(18.4)	–	18.4	September 2012	–	(6.0)	47.5	53.5
October 2008	10.0	(30.0)	52.5	72.5	October 2010	–	–	–	–	October 2012	–	(24.5)	23.0	47.5
November 2008	–	(32.0)	20.5	52.5	November 2010	–	–	–	–	November 2012	–	–	23.0	23.0
December 2008	19.0	(16.0)	23.5	39.5	December 2010	4.0	–	4.0	4.0					
January 2009	28.0	(15.0)	36.5	51.5	January 2011	3.5	–	7.5	7.5					
February 2009	3.5	–	40.0	40.0	February 2011	46.5	(41.0)	13.0	47.5					
March 2009	8.0	(36.0)	12.0	48.0	March 2011	–	–	13.0	13.0					
April 2009	6.0	–	18.0	18.0	April 2011	11.5	–	24.5	24.5					
May 2009	–	–	18.0	18.0	May 2011	4.0	–	28.5	28.5					
June 2009	–	–	18.0	18.0	June 2011	13.0	–	41.5	41.5					
July 2009	–	–	18.0	18.0	July 2011	34.5	–	76.0	76.0					
August 2009	–	–	18.0	18.0	August 2011	5.0	–	81.0	81.0					
September 2009	3.0	–	21.0	21.0	September 2011	12.0	(66.0)	27.0	93.0					
October 2009	–	(12.0)	9.0	21.0	October 2011	–	(3.0)	24.0	27.0					
November 2009	–	–	9.0	9.0	November 2011	25.0	–	49.0	49.0					
December 2009	4.5	–	13.5	13.5	December 2011	–	–	49.0	49.0					
January 2010	18.5	–	32.0	32.0	January 2012	–	(18.0)	31.0	49.0					
February 2010	4.0	–	36.0	36.0	February 2012	23.5	–	54.5	54.5					
March 2010	–	(24.0)	12.0	36.0	March 2012	–	(18.0)	36.5	54.5					
April 2010	–	–	12.0	12.0	April 2012	9.0	–	45.5	45.5					
May 2010	–	–	12.0	12.0	May 2012	–	–	45.5	45.5					
June 2010	–	–	12.0	12.0	June 2012	9.0	(3.5)	51.0	54.5					

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Agenda items 33, 54, 83 and 121

Prevention of armed conflict

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 7 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

On 10 and 11 December 2012, Slovakia, in its capacity as Chair of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, organized a series of events on the United Nations approach to security sector reform. The events were held in cooperation with the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (United Nations Development Programme) and with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The series of events comprised: (a) the official launch of the first set of Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform developed by the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force; (b) a high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform; and (c) an expert-level seminar. Member States showed a high level of interest in the events, which generated several recommendations for the United Nations system that have been included in the summary of the Chair on the series (see annex).

In this regard, I have the honour to submit to you the summary of the Chair as the outcome document of the series, and request your kind assistance in issuing the present letter and its annex as a document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under items 33, 54, 83 and 121, and as a document of the Security Council, and in distributing it to all Member States.

(*Signed*) František **Ružička**
Ambassador

13-23124 (E) 010313

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 7 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

The United Nations and security sector reform: high- and expert-level events held in New York on 10 and 11 December 2012, hosted by Slovakia in its capacity as Chair of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform

Chair's statement

1. On 10 and 11 December 2012, Slovakia, in its capacity as Chair of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, hosted a series of events: (a) a reception for the launch of the first set of Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform developed by the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force; (b) a high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform; and (c) an expert-level seminar. The events were supported by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The overarching objectives of these events were to assess progress in terms of United Nations engagement in supporting security sector reform processes since the first report of the Secretary-General on the topic was issued in January 2008 (A/62/659-S/2008/39) and to provide substantive input for the further development of a comprehensive United Nations approach to security sector reform in the context of the second report of the Secretary-General on the topic, to be issued in 2013.

Launch of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform

2. The launch of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform on 10 December brought together approximately 70 representatives of Member States and the United Nations. Hosted by the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations, Ambassador František Ružička, at his residence, the event included the delivery of remarks by Deputy Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Peter Burian and the two co-Chairs of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Dmitry Titov (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Jordan Ryan (UNDP). The speakers presented the first volume of the Guidance Notes, which includes an introduction on the United Nations approach to security sector reform and specific guidance notes on national ownership of security sector reform, gender-responsive security sector reform, peace processes and security sector reform, democratic governance of the security sector and United Nations support to national security policymaking and strategy-making processes. The speakers underlined the value of the Guidance Notes as the embodiment of a common United Nations approach to security sector reform that provides staff in the field and at Headquarters with coherent, system-wide guidance on support to security sector reform processes. It was emphasized that the Guidance Notes represent a crucial element in terms of the implementation of the first report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. The speakers called for the key

messages of the Guidance Notes to be disseminated widely and used systematically in the field. It was also emphasized that the use of the Guidance Notes in the field, including the development of sound monitoring and evaluation practices, would require enhanced resources and continued support by Member States and partners.

Open high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform

3. The open high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, held on the morning of 11 December, was attended by more than 100 representatives of Member States and of the United Nations. The meeting featured keynote addresses by Deputy Minister Burian, Assistant Secretary-General Titov and Assistant Administrator Ryan. These were followed by statements by the Permanent Representatives of Canada, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the Republic of Moldova, and representatives of Argentina, Indonesia, Slovakia, South Africa and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It provided insights into the United Nations approach to security sector reform to date and Member States' perspectives on priorities for the second report of the Secretary-General on such reform. Particular focus was placed on regional perspectives and partnerships, drawing on the input provided at various regional workshops held in recent years for the Organization's evolving approach to security sector reform. Member States also shared their experiences and lessons identified in supporting the United Nations in security sector reform.

United Nations approach to security sector reform

4. Concerning the evolution of the United Nations approach to security sector reform to date, the Group of Friends recognized that a number of achievements had been made in the areas of field support, normative development and partnerships. In the area of field support, significant progress is visible in the widespread recognition that security sector reform is an essential element of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. This is based on the strengthening of Headquarters and field capacities to deliver coherent support to national and regional security sector reform processes. The inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have emerged as centres of excellence on such reform. The development of a roster of security sector reform experts, which is managed by the Unit, has increased access to rapidly deployable civilian experts. Extensive outreach and consultations with national, regional and international partners have led to the development of partnerships and to an enhanced understanding of the basic principles and norms that underpin the normative and operational roles of the United Nations with regard to security sector reform. In the area of normative development, the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform was raised as a significant achievement, which represents a contribution to the implementation of a key component of the first report of the Secretary-General. Moreover, it was highlighted that the Guidance Notes represent a body of United Nations experience and, as such, are a reflection of empirically based good practices. The priority is now to operationalize the Notes through coordinated action and enhanced support in the field. Finally, it was recognized that partnerships are essential for ensuring the relevance and sustainability of security sector reform efforts on the ground. Much progress has been made, notably with the African Union through the development of the capacity-building partnership between the African Union Commission and the

Department of Peacekeeping Operations. However, there is still a need to strengthen partnerships with other regional and subregional organizations. This includes the need to engage with organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the East African Community, the Economic Community of West African States and other regional economic communities, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in the Horn of Africa), the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Southern African Development Community.

Regional perspectives

5. The important roles that regional organizations play in security sector reform were emphasized in the first report of the Secretary-General. Since then, significant work has been undertaken to learn more about regional perspectives on security sector reform, support their capacity development in this area and lay the ground for long-term partnerships where appropriate. In this regard, Member States reflected on the insights derived from numerous regional workshops that had provided opportunities to discuss approaches and identify regional capacities and good practices. Those discussions had also provided important input for the development of the United Nations approach to security sector reform. Notably, a series of three workshops was co-hosted by Slovakia and a Member State from different regions with the assistance of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The first workshop, on "Enhancing United Nations support for security sector reform in Africa: towards an African perspective", was co-hosted by Slovakia and South Africa and held in Cape Town on 7 and 8 November 2007 (see S/2007/687). This workshop made an important contribution to the first report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. The second workshop, on "Contributing to the United Nations approach to security sector reform: insights from Latin America and the Caribbean", was co-hosted by Argentina and Slovakia and held in Buenos Aires on 28 and 29 September 2009 (see A/64/530). The third workshop, on "The Role of the United Nations in multidimensional peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding: towards an ASEAN perspective", was co-hosted by Indonesia and Slovakia and held in Jakarta on 29 and 30 March 2010 (see A/64/811). In addition, the Government of Canada funded an African regional workshop on security sector reform that was held in March 2009, with support from the Security Sector Reform Unit and in full partnership with the African Union Commission. Since then, numerous other security sector reform-related events with a regional component have been sponsored by Member States. In particular, Nigeria and South Africa, in cooperation with the United Nations, co-hosted two high-level forums and expert seminars on African perspectives on security sector reform, held in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Another high-level event, on "Challenges and opportunities for security sector reform in East Africa", was co-hosted by Slovakia and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and held in Nairobi in October 2012. It was recognized that all these events have shaped the way in which the United Nations perceives its role and supports security sector reform in these regions. They have also provided a rich body of regional experiences and lessons for ongoing reflections on the second report of the Secretary-General.

6. It was acknowledged that the United Nations global framework for security sector reform can be meaningful and sustainable only if it is linked to regional

approaches. Each regional building block can provide an important contribution to the larger framework. Against this background, it was recognized that there is also a need to engage with and learn from experiences gained in broad peacebuilding, development and democratization contexts, where security sector reform is equally relevant. If the United Nations is to be effective, it needs to take into account these contexts and the unique challenges and opportunities they present. The United Nations can, for example, draw on the experiences of Latin American and the Caribbean with regard to addressing people-oriented security or of South-East Asia with regard to supporting confidence-building efforts.

7. It was recognized that a number of the principles that had been identified in the first report of the Secretary-General — and that have been emphasized in the various regional workshops — remained of utmost relevance today. These include strengthening accountability and democratic governance in the security sector, promoting national ownership and enhancing coordination among national and international security sector reform stakeholders. It was observed that the challenge lies in how to operationalize these principles. It was also noted, in this respect, that the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on national ownership and democratic governance ought to help in addressing some of the challenges to implementation. However, greater emphasis is needed on monitoring and evaluating the progress made by the United Nations in support of the implementation of the principles.

Member State perspectives

8. In addition to continued learning from regional experiences, there is a pressing need to reflect on global challenges, opportunities and trends in the area of security sector reform and the implications for United Nations support to such reform. Several Member States shared their views on important issues that need to be addressed. First, it was recognized that the concept of people-oriented security is essential. Security sector reform efforts need to take into account people's experiences in security and justice, in addition to focusing on State institutions. This means looking at local approaches to security sector reform that are based on greater engagement with communities. Second, the implications of recent policy agendas, such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, adopted at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011, may be considered. From a security sector reform perspective, this requires supporting country-led and country-owned reforms, as well as reflecting on how to build, not substitute, capacities. Third, the importance of coordination to support security sector reform in a complementary manner must be recognized. In this respect, the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes was raised as a good example of how United Nations inter-agency coordination could lead to tangible outcomes. However, now that the Guidance Notes have been launched, substantial resources need to be dedicated to outreach and training, as well as to monitoring and evaluating their use and, ultimately, their impact in the field. It was underlined that written materials are only as good as the changes reflected in the field.

9. Sustainability and affordability were also identified as key issues. The 2012 public expenditure and needs assessment review of the Liberian security sector, undertaken by the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the World Bank, was cited as an example of an effort to address affordability challenges in the context of transitions. In this respect, it was recognized that long-term funding is essential to ensure financial sustainability and the flexibility required to respond to changes in

complex environments. Long-term funding commitments from both national authorities and their partners need to go beyond quick-win and outcome-oriented approaches to allow for predictability of funding and support national ownership.

10. Finally, participants reiterated the value of the Group of Friends, which brings together Member States with an extremely rich collection of experiences in security sector reform. The organization of meetings of this high-level group was commended for two reasons. First, it enabled Member States to provide input for the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. Second, it marked a revitalization of the Group of Friends as an important platform for dialogue among Member States and a useful interface between Member States and the United Nations system. In this context, South Africa has accepted to become the first rotating co-Chair of the Group of Friends, thus opening the chairmanship up to a Member State from the global South for the first time.

Expert-level seminar on the United Nations and security sector reform

11. The expert-level seminar on "The United Nations and security sector reform" that followed the high-level meeting of the Group of Friends brought together over 50 representatives of Member States and the United Nations and experts. The seminar featured speakers from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and the Peacebuilding Support Office, as well as experts representing regional networks in Africa (the African Security Sector Network) and Asia (the Asia Consultative Group on Security Sector Reform). The seminar provided for substantive discussion on the key themes to be addressed in the development of the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. The first panel assessed critically the achievements made since the adoption of the first report of the Secretary-General, in 2008, and identified the challenges faced in translating its principles and messages into practice. The second panel explored new trends in the area of security sector reform and how the United Nations should position itself to best respond to those trends.

Challenges of implementation

12. It was recognized that the first report of the Secretary-General was a pioneering endeavour and that a number of key achievements have been made in terms of implementation. First, United Nations capacities at Headquarters and in the field have been reinforced to better respond to the growing demand for security sector reform support from national authorities. The number of requests have increased exponentially over the past five years and are becoming increasingly complex as the dynamics of conflict change and as the United Nations adapts its response to fragility and violence. Second, the inter-agency approach to security sector reform has been strengthened through the work of the Security Sector Reform Task Force. Third, the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes represents a significant achievement in terms of implementing a crucial element of the first report. In this respect, it was noted that the significant work of the Task Force should be commended, in particular its role in the development of the Guidance Notes, which built on the individual comparative advantages of the various members of the Task Force.

13. Despite the notable achievements, it was acknowledged that some challenges in implementing the messages contained in the first report remained. First, the

United Nations was under pressure to provide far-reaching support but it was limited in terms of both human and financial resources. The inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, for example, relies on extrabudgetary funding, which means that it is not able to meet its full potential as a system-wide coordination and support mechanism. Its secretariat, the Security Sector Reform Unit, also faces resource constraints that make it challenging to keep up with the soaring demand for assistance. These constraints need to be understood better if the gap between expectations and capability is to be closed. Second, there is a need to complement institutional capacity-development with an enhanced focus on improving service delivery, namely security and public safety, to end-users. This requires supporting people-centred approaches to security sector reform and recognizing that partnerships should be forged not only with regional organizations and Governments but also with civil society organizations and other non-State actors. Partnerships within the United Nations system are also crucial to leverage political capacities on the issue. Doing so means reflecting on how to engage more systematically with the special representatives and deputy-special representatives of the Secretary-General in the field and with the Peacebuilding Commission, among others. Third, efforts should be made to go beyond a focus on security sector components such as police, military, customs, immigration, civil emergency and other related functions. The United Nations and its partners should enhance the assistance they provide at the sector-wide level by, for example, providing support to national security policy and legislative frameworks, national dialogues for a common security vision, democratic and civilian oversight, civil society and other initiatives that define the strategic, security sector budgeting and financial management, governance and oversight framework for reform, and the roles, responsibilities and powers of security institutions. Initiatives at the sector-wide level aim to produce systemic improvements within the security sector by transforming the strategic, architectural and foundational basis common to all security sector components. There is also a need to reflect on how to better promote linkages to other policy areas and initiatives, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the rule of law, and armed violence and development. Finally, in terms of understanding the value of the United Nations support to security sector reform, there is a need to strongly engage in monitoring and evaluation and, in particular, to reflect on how to meaningfully measure impact.

New trends in security sector reform

14. In the seminar a number of examples of new trends that are relevant for security sector reform and United Nations engagement in this area were identified. These include: the dramatically evolving nature of conflict, which requires new approaches that go beyond purely military or diplomatic approaches; the recognition that violence is one of the biggest obstacles to human development and that addressing violence requires enhanced linkages between security sector reform and development; and the existence of new policy initiatives, such as the international dialogue on peacebuilding and State-building initiative of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which, among other things, is developing indicators that will support the measurement of progress in important areas of security sector reform.

15. In terms of how the United Nations should position itself to adapt to these trends, numerous approaches were discussed. First, there is a need to recognize and

act on linkages between security sector reform and development, peacebuilding and political transitions. This includes placing security sector reform within a larger strategic framework and supporting national dialogues on such reform. Second, security sector reform should be supported as part of a society-wide rather than a State-centric approach. This presupposes an additional emphasis on local solutions. Third, further support should be provided for South-South cooperation on security sector reform. There needs to be a more direct exchange of experiences among countries that have already undergone reform processes. Such an exchange should include the sharing of both knowledge and technical capacities. Fourth, further emphasis is required on the governance, oversight and management dimensions of security sector reform, with a focus on promoting transparency, responsibility and participation to ensure the effective and accountable delivery of safety and security.

Recommendations

16. The series of events provided a valuable platform for discussing the United Nations approach to security sector reform. The high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform and the expert-level seminar resulted in a concrete body of recommendations that were welcomed by United Nations representatives as important contributions for the second report of the Secretary-General on how best to strengthen the comprehensive United Nations approach to security sector reform, which was requested by the Security Council in its presidential statement of 12 October 2011 (S/PRST/2011/19).

Normative level

17. Some of the key recommendations relating to the normative level follow:

(a) There are many contexts other than post-conflict situations where security sector reform is relevant. The United Nations approach to such reform should take into account the need to engage with and learn from experiences gained in broad peacebuilding, development and democratization contexts. The second report of the Secretary-General should take into account these different contexts and assess the support that the United Nations has provided to determine if and how its approach to security sector reform should be adapted to provide effective support in these different contexts;

(b) There is a need to go back to the foundations of security sector reform. A number of security sector reform principles were highlighted in the first report of the Secretary-General and have been emphasized at the various regional workshops that Member States have supported. However, a number of the principles have remained difficult to put into practice. These include, in particular, the principles on national ownership, security sector reform strategies and frameworks, and national and international coordination. In the second report of the Secretary-General, the practicality and validity of the principles contained in the first report should be assessed against the current context. Principles of national ownership, democratic governance of the security sector and national and international coordination should be highlighted as core principles that need to be addressed across the United Nations system. Significant work has been done to incorporate these principles into the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform. Emphasis should be placed on recording and reviewing progress made in the implementation of the Guidance Notes and on compiling best practices;

(c) There is a need to reflect more on a people-centred approach to security sector reform that is based on the improvement of service delivery in the areas of security and public safety to the population. The United Nations should continue to look for ways and means of improving its effectiveness on the ground and assisting Member States in addressing the whole of society.

Operational level

18. Some of the key recommendations relating to the operational level follow:

(a) United Nations support for security sector reform is limited in terms of both human and financial resources. These constraints need to be understood better if the gap between expectations and capability is to be closed. Security sector reform processes require multi-year funding programmes to enhance flexibility in the provision of support as well as long-term planning, which can lead to strengthened sustainability of support. The second report of the Secretary-General should assess how United Nations system-wide human and financial resources in the field and at Headquarters have contributed to the achievement of security sector reform objectives. Based on this assessment and keeping in mind value-for-money principles, consideration should be given in the report to the capacities needed to match support requirements. Such capacities could include enhancing the role and strengthening the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and its members in terms of their ability to provide backstopping support to the field and to fulfil their system-wide roles;

(b) While the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force has demonstrated the value of its coordination role during the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, further effort should be made to build on this. This includes the need to reflect on the interoperability of Task Force members. The second report of the Secretary-General should include ways to leverage political capacities and build on existing United Nations strengths and comparative advantages;

(c) Partnerships have been a key element of the United Nations approach to security sector reform, and further attention should be given to enhancing them, especially with Governments and regional and subregional organizations. There is also a need to include national and international non-State actors involved in security sector reform in these interactions, dialogue and frameworks of cooperation. In addition, partnerships should be forged while focusing more on providing support to South-South cooperation;

(d) Greater attention needs to be paid to monitoring and evaluating United Nations support efforts in the area of security sector reform. This is required in order to understand better the impact that the Organization's support has on such reform, with the ultimate objective of further enhancing the support provided.

The way forward

19. During the events, a number of follow-up measures were identified, including:

(a) Submission of the Chair's statement on the events to the Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly for circulation to Member States and to United Nations agencies and

departments in order to provide further impetus to the continuing dialogue on United Nations support to security sector reform;

(b) Holding of the next meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, at the working level, in the first quarter of 2013, with special emphasis on continuing the important dialogue on the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform;

(c) Dissemination of the core messages contained in the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes to a wide audience. Slovakia will examine, with the co-Chairs of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the possibility of organizing other launch or roll-out events in other regions of the world.